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1. Introduction 
The present Meeting of the Legal 
Subcommittee ofUNCOPUOS has adopted 
a new item on the agenda: the "Review of 
the status of the five international treaties 
governing outer space", as proposed by the 
Government of the Republic of Mexico. 1 
This item may well constitute a valuable 
contribution to the codification and further 
development of the international law 
pertinent to space activities. 
The document proposes two major steps to 
be taken in order to achieve the widest and 
fullest adherence to the treaties concerned. 
Firstly, information should be collected with 
each state as to why it has, in pertinent cases, 
I See further document 
AI AC.105/C21L.206/Rev.1, of 4 April 1997 
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refrained from ratifYing or signing specific 
treaties on outer space. Secondly, states are 
invited to express their views on ways to 
further the adherence to these space treaties. 
The treaties between themselves have 
established within a relatively speaking short 
tune frame a legal framework for activities in 
space which is workable as well as rather 
comprehensive and coherent. Therefore, the 
effort to enhance the adherence to' and 
application of space law by means of the 
present proposal is to be applauded very 
much. At the same time, the aims which the 
proposal tries to achieve should for that 
reason be interpreted as broadly and 
generously as possible. This certainly applies 
to the Liability Convention of 1972 2 
2Convention on International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects (hereafter 
Liability Convention). 
London/MoscowlWashingtol1. adopted 29 November 
197 L opened for signature 29 March 1972. entered 
into force 1 September 1972: 10 ILM 965 (1971): 24 
UST 2389: TIAS 7762: 961 UNTS 187. 
von der Dunk in Proceedings of the Forty-First Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 366-373 (1998). 
Copyright 1998, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. Used by permission.
2. The Liabilitr Convention the status quo 
and current developments 
Taking stocks of the present measure of 
adherence to the Liability Convention, 
according to the most recent information3, 
currently there are 76 states which have 
ratified the Convention.4 A further 25 states 
have signed the Convention. So, slightly over 
half of the world's states are presently bound 
at least to respects of the Liability 
Convention. That is not a bad score, 
especially if one keeps in mind that amongst 
them more or less all the space-faring 
countries nations are to be found. 5 
Moreover, the Liability Convention 
essentially is an elaboration of article VII of 
the Outer Space Treaty. 6 This means, that 
even states neither party nor signatory to the 
3See AlAC.105/C.21L.206/Rev.1 of 4 April 
1997, at 1. 
4Signature without further ratification is 
generally conceived under international law to imply 
for the state in question at least the duty not to defeat 
object and purpose of such a treaty; in otller words: 
not to clearly behave in contradiction with the 
general spirit and main aims of the treaty at issue. 
Cf. Art 18(a), Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, Vienna, done 23 May 1969, entered into 
force 27 January 1980; 8 ILM 679 (1969). Thus, 
some general obligations may be deduced even for 
such state under that treaty. 
5 Amongst those states which did neither 
sign nor ratify the convention, from this perspective 
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Thailand, Tonga and Turkey 
may be deemed the most notable. 
6Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Expiration and Use of 
Outer Space. including the Moon und Other Celestial 
Bodies (hereafter Outer Space Treaty), London-
Moscow-Washington, adopted 19 December 1966, 
opened for signature 27 January 1967, entered into 
force 10 October 1967; 6 ILM 386 (1967); 18 UST 
2410; TIAS 6347; 610 
UNIS 20S. 
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Liability Convention, while on the contrary 
having ratified or signed the Outer Space 
Treaty, are not allowed to simply ignore its 
legal contents. Such states would have to 
prove in any given case that the former 
Convention would not constitute an 
elaboration with customary legal force of the 
latter Treaty.7 
The other problem is more specifically of a 
legal character. The privatization of space 
and space activities challenges the essence of 
international space law, as currently given 
shape mainly through the five treaties at 
issue. The historically detennined and almost 
complete orientation of the col]J1Is juris 
spatialis internationalis on states and state 
actors is put in the balance. 
The Liability Convention warrants special 
attention from this dual perspective. As to 
space debris, legally speaking the proqlem is 
usually phrased in terms of liability for the 
damage caused by such debris. Regarding 
privatization, the mode of operation of the 
rules on liability in the case of private space 
ventures is of paramount importance for the 
safety of commercial operations in outer 
space. 
3. The Liability Convention and space 
debris 
7The only directly important case of a state 
missing amongst the parties to the Outer Space 
Treaty. yet important from the perspective of the 
Liability Convention because of the B~konur launch 
base, concerns Kazakhstan. Amongst those further 
absent from the list of parties and signatories the 
most noteworthy examples in terms of interest in. 
and capacity for space activities are such states as 
Costa Rica, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of 
Korea and Portugal, as well as a number of other 
former constituent pans of the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia. 
By and large those states themselves capable 
of causing space debris (however 
inadvertently) are already bound by the 
Liability Convention's provisions. Thus, the 
major task to achieve in this respect would 
be to enhance its effective application, rather 
than adherence as such Further adherence, to 
the extent considered essential' would 
anyway also hinge upon the perceived 
effectiveness of the Convention. Three maJor 
problems would call for a solution to achieve 
large steps forward on this issue. 
3.1. The definition of5pace ol?ject. 
The first problem relates to the definition of 
"space object" or "component parts" thereof, 
as it triggers the application of the 
Convention's liability rules. The question 
arises here to what extent space debris falls, 
or could fall within that definition. At the 
theoretical level, this problem has been 
discussed extensively. Usually, the debate 
turned around the (potential) functioning or 
functionality perceived by many to be 
inherent in the definition of "space object", 
which would thus exclude 'useless' space 
debris. 8 
Here, two different solutions could be 
envisaged. On the one hand, one could aim 
for an authoritative international 
interpretation that would include space 
debris as such in the definition of "space 
object" or, preferably, of "component part". 
This solution has the major advantage of 
informality while nevertheless making the 
Convention applicable in relevant cases. 
In the alternative, a formal amendment 
might be required, when the first solution 
would be considered to run counter to logic 
8See e.g. S. Gorove, Issues Pertaining to the 
Legal Definition "Space Object", 2 
Telecommunications & Space Journal (1995), 135 fr. 
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and/or certain other provisions already 
dealing with space· objects and their 
component parts. Such an amendment 
should essentially extend the present quasi-
definition of "space object" as found in 
Article I( d) of the Convention. A space 
object· should be redefined as including, 
where applicable, any part of it capable of 
causing damage. Of course, the practical 
problem of identification remains. Often, a 
certain piece of space debris can not be 
related to a specific space object. In such 
cases effective operation of the Liability 
Convention for the purpose of redeeming 
damage would in any case be precluded. 
This problem as such lies outside the scope 
of the Liability Convention itself - and would 
be a matter either for the Registration 
Convention9, or for non-legal 
instrumentaliti es. 
3.2. Unident?/iable ,\pace debris 
In the abstract law could perhaps be 
supportive to dealing with damage caused by 
those pieces of debris which cannot be 
retraced to a certain space object and 
thereby to a certain space launching state. 
Thus, the second major problem related to 
the Liability Convention poses itself as: how 
can the law enhance the solution of problems 
caused by unidentifiable space debris and the 
damage it causes? Two options might be 
worthy of consideration and discussion in 
this respect. Both would clearly require 
formal additions to the Liability Convention, 
most probably through additional protocols. 
9Convention on Registration of Objects 
Launched Into Outer Space (hereafter Registration 
Convention), New, York, adopted 12 November 
1974, opened for signahlfe 14 January 1975. entered 
into force 15 September 1976: 14 ILM 43 (1975): n 
UST 695: TJAS 8480: 1023 ENTS 15. 
Firstly, there would be the preventive option 
of establishing a worldwide monitoring 
entity, tracking debris not only in a more 
comprehensive fashion than is already the 
case, but also making these data available to 
all those potentially interested. It might well 
be that too often lack of information on 
certain launches, the discarding of satellites, 
and accidents or incidents in outer space is at 
the basis of the inability to track a certain 
piece of space debris causing damage. 
As a matter of fact, some minds keen on the 
problem have already gone one large step 
further. Thus, the University of Arizona has 
set up a project not so much to create a 
global entity monitoring debris, and its 
corning into existence, but aiming to actually 
clean up outer space or at least some 
junkyard and graveyard orbits. III It will be 
obvious, however, that fmancialand other 
obstacles would preclude creation of such a 
space garbage collector for the near future. 
Secondly, the option to establish an 
international guarantee fund has repeatedly 
entered the discussion. Many states know of 
such a construction nationally with regard to 
road transport: damage caused by 
unidentified and unidentifiable cars (read 
their owners and drivers) to innocent victims 
is compensated from such a fund Similarly, 
an international guarantee fund might 
compensate damage caused by unidentifiable 
space debris. The fund should be financed at 
least largely by the active space-faring 
community. One could think in this respect 
of an obligatory contribution to the 
gu~rantee fund for every individual launch in 
JOSee P. Stems & L. Tennen, The 
Autonomous Space Processor for Orbital Debris 
(ASPOD) Project and the Law of Outer Space: 
Preliminary Jurisprudential ObsenJations. in 
Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth Colloquium on the 
Law of Outer Space (1996), 107-20. 
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the form of a particular percentage of the 
launch cost. 
3.3. The definition of" damage" 
The third major problem related to the 
Liability Convention from the perspective of 
space debris concerns the definition of 
"damage". The general consensus is that the 
term Itdamage'\ as defined by Article I(a) of 
the Convention, is confined to physical 
damage to property and, in the case of 
humans themselves, mental damage. "II 
The mere pollution of the space 
environment, which is almost by definition 
the result of the coming into being of space 
debris, is not "damage" in such a sense that 
it triggers application of the Convention. 11 
may be hard to substantiate any damage later 
on caused by the existence of such pollution 
to scientific or commercial activities. Yet, a 
way should probably be found to attach a 
direct and substantial price tag to creating 
such space debris, with the "fine" thus paid 
going into the guarantee fund alluded before. 
Obviously, this would be a solution for a 
distinct protocol to achieve. 
Another aspect of the issue of "damage" as 
related to space debris may require a less 
formal solution. Including in the operative 
definition of damage. the indirect' damage 
which commercial operations would offer 
from particular pieces of space debris would 
only need an authoritative interpretation, for 
example by way of an UNCOPUOS-guided 
Resolution. A similar solution could be 
found in including the damage which 
scientific activities suffer from space debris, 
in terms of the high costs it would, take to 
IlSee P.L. Meredith & G.S. Robinson .. 
Space Law: A Case Study for the Practitioner 
(1992), 62-4; C.Q. Christol. The Modem 
International Law of Outer Space (1982), 97-100: S. 
Gorove, Developments in Space Law (]99]). 224 5. 
242. 
achieve the intended results, in the notion of 
damage as relevant under the Convention. 
4. The Liability Convention and private 
space· activities. 
, 
The present regime ofinternational space law 
does not take private space activities into 
account in any detailed manner. International 
liability for space activities and their Juridical 
consequences therefore exclusively rests with 
the states. This holds good. apparently, also 
In cases where the activities under 
consideration are partly or even exclusively 
undertaken by private entities. In this case, 
one major problem stands out when it comes 
to effective adherence and application. It 
even precedes any discussion on the 
effectiveness of the dispute settlement system 
incorporated in the Convention and its 
application to cases of involvement of private 
entities. The gradual privatization of space 
activities necessitates a closer look at the 
attribution ofliability as dealt with under the 
Convention. 
4.1. Liability at the international level 
It is true that the Liability Convention does 
provide for a clear, fourfold definition of the 
entities liable in case a space activity causes 
damage to another state or its entities. The 
definition operates through a focus on the 
launch of the space object which causes the 
damage under consideration. More 
importantly, in each case it is a particular 
state or number of states being made liable. 
Thus, the Convention qualifies cumulatively 
as liable states the state which launched the 
relevant space object, the state which 
procured that launch, the state whose facility 
was used for that launch, and finally the state 
whose territory was used for that launch. 12 
l2See Art. I(c), Liability Convention. 
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In this regard, the definition of 'procurement' 
is generally agreed upon as 'causing the 
launch to occur, which boils down in most 
cases to paying for it. Furthermore the 
(seemingly) clear definition of who is liable 
under what kind of liability and for which 
damage is further enhanced by provisions for 
example detailing the rules for cases where 
different states qualifY as liable states. 13 
However, the operation of the Convention's 
regime in cases of private involvement is far 
from clear. What if no officials of a state or 
state agency are involved in the conduct of 
the relevant launch, but only employees of a 
private launch provider? Does this qualifY 
the state whose nationals such employees are 
as the - liable state? Or does it, in the 
alternative, make the state liable whose 
nationality the private entity has - which 
could very well be another state? Both such 
interpretations on the basis of nationality 
would invoke an equation of private 
activities and state activities as provided by 
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty in the 
application of Article VII of the Outer Space 
Treaty and the Liability Convention. 
Or should, under this criterion, no state be 
considered the liable one? Could the Liability 
Convention then nevertheless, as if applying 
by proxy, make the launching entity directly 
and privately liable? Similar problems may 
arise regarding private entities procuring 
launches, or offering their facilities for 
launch. 
Only on the issue of territory, no private 
entity could juridically 'take the place' of a 
state. At least one state could always be 
pinpointed as the liable entity in case of 
damage. But even the criterion of territory 
will no longer serve as an absolute guarantee 
J3See Art. IV. V. Liability Convention 
that someone would be obliged to 
compensate damage in applicable cases. 14 
The Sea Launch-project now well under 
way, is about to conduct the first launches 
from the high seas - outside any state's 
territory in a legal sense! - soon. 15 
4.2. Liability at the national level 
Some states have already solved this problem 
on their own account and as far as relevant 
for themselves. Faced with the consequences 
of private space activities under this 
international liability regime, they enacted 
national laws specifically - dealing with space 
and space activities of private enterprise16. 
These laws generally include provisions for 
reimbursement by the private entity licensed 
under the national law of any compensation 
paid out by the states as a consequence of 
international liability claims. 
14Cf. A. Kerrest de Rozavel, Launching 
spacecraft from the sea and the Outer Space Treaty: 
The Sea Launch Project, paper presented at the 
Fortieth Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 
Turin, Oct. 1997 (to be published 1998), 6: "the 
territory of launch is, at the moment, a "lock" in the 
system. C ... ) In the territory criterion is left aside 
because of a launch from international domain, this 
lock is being abandoned". 
15See e.g. A. Kerrest de Rozavel, The 
Launch of Spacecraft from the Sea, in Outlook on 
Space Law over tlle Next 30 Years (Eds. G. 
Lafferranderie· & D. Crowther)(1997), 217 ff. 
l'This concerns tlle United States, Sweden, 
the United Kingdom, Russia and South Africa, and 
(to a certain extent) France vis-a-vis Arianespace. 
National (or in the case of France semi-international) 
legal measures have been taken by tllose states, inter 
alia providing for systems for licensing relevant 
private entities and dealing amongst otllers with the 
international liability of the licensing state for the 
activities of such licences. 
371 
The point is, however, that the framework 
for such national legislation is not properly 
defined on the international level. As a 
consequence, such national legislation 
threatens to preclude any unifonn 
interpretation and application of the terms of 
the Liability Convention. Gaps and overlaps 
in terms of scope may appear, threatening 
the consistency and uniformity of the 
application of the international liability 
regime as a whole, and thereby its effective 
operation. 
Moreover, in the absence of unequivocal and 
authoritative international guidance, the 
'practice' of national space legislation 
effectively starts working the other way 
round as well. It may constitute opinio juris 
sive necesitatis of relevant states establishing 
customary legal character of certain 
interpretations. 17 Thus, a strong argument 
can be made for looking at national 
legislation for the purposes of determining 
the legally correct interpretation of 
international legal principles and notions. 
It is true, that in all cases obligations to 
reimburse the state are applied to space 
objects launched by private entities fi-om the 
respective territory. However, such 
obligations are only rarely made applicable 
as such to private entities who launch the 
space object in question, procure such a 
launch or lend their faCility for such a 
launch, on the basis merely for example of 
that private entity having the nationality of 
that state. 
Should one indeed read from this that it is 
possible that under the criteria of launch 
itself, procurement or facility no state might 
be found which qualifies as a liable entity, 
because it were private entities launching, 
17See e.g. 1. Brounlie. Principles of Public 
International Law (3rd ed.) (1979), 4-12. 
procuring and lending their facility for that 
launch? Then we might be in trouble if, 
indeed, the criterion of territory will turn out 
no longer to be the guarantee of finding at 
least one state liable. 
Or should one continue to be dependent 
upon discretionary unilateral action, such as 
in the case of Sea Launch where the United 
States obliged Boeing Commercial Space 
Corporation to obtain a license under the 
United States Commercial Space Launch 
Act?18. While Boeing CSC may be the largest 
shareholder in the Sea Launch consortium, 
with its 40% share it is not the majority 
shareholder. Moreover, Sea Launch itself is 
registered in the Grand Cayman Islands and 
thus, legally speaking, a consortium with the 
nationality of the United Kingdom! 19 
4.3. Linking international liability and 
nationalliabilitv 
. 
Essentially, two options are open to solve 
these uncertainties. Firstly, a generally 
accepted and very broad definition of liable 
state would be accepted. It should include in 
the term "state" those private entities with 
the nationality of that state, for purposes of 
launching, procuring launches and lending 
facilities for launches. Secondly, an 
amendment creating direct private liability 
ISUnder Sec. 6(a)(3)(A), Commercial Space 
Launch Aa (Public Law 98-S7S, 98th Congress, H.R. 
3942,30 October 1984; 98 Stat. 3055, amended by 
Commercial Space Lmmch Act Amendments, Public 
Law 100"-'1557. 100th Congress, H.R. 4399, 15 
November 1988; 49 U.S.C. App. 261S; 102 Stat 
3900). by being, in view of its 40% share controlled 
by Boeing CSC, Sea Launch comes within the scope 
of the definition of a United States corporate 
national. 
19See e.g. the Case Concerning the 
Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, 
Limited (Second Phase) (Belgium v Spain). 5 
Febmary 1970, I.Cl Rep. 1970,4, at 42. 
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under international space law would prevent 
national authorities from applying, 
consciously or unconsciously, their own, far 
from harmonized interpretations by means of 
nationallaw.20 Solving this problem should 
be given high priority, before more and more 
states will find themselves confronted with 
the potential consequences of the ongoing 
privatization of space. They will then 
perceive a need to issue national regulation 
vis-a-vis private enterprise without any 
authoritative international guidance as to its 
scope and contents. The result may be not 
just gaps and overlaps, but 'flags of 
convenience', 'license shopping' and a 
growing disinterest in taking care ofliability 
issues altogether. 
5. Conclusion 
The increase in private involvement in space 
2°Cf. e.g. H.A. Wassenbergh. PuNic Law 
Aspects (?i Private Space Activities and ,"imce 
Tran,~portation in the Future, in Proceedings of the 
Thirty-Eighth Colloquium on the Law of Outer 
Space (1Y96), 247-8; H A Wassenbergh, A Launch 
and a Space Transportation Lmv, separate .Ih)J1I 
Outer Space Law?, 21 Air & Space Law, (1996),29-
31, for ideas on a private liability system for space 
activities. Such public international law systems 
dealing with private liability, can be found for 
instance in the neighboring fieJd of air law. See e.g 
Warsaw Convention for tIle Unification of Certain 
Rules Relating to International Transportation by 
Air, Warsaw, done 12 October 1929. entered into 
force 13 Febmaty 1933: 137 LNTS J 1: dealing with 
private liability for damage sllstained by passenger$ 
and cargo; and Rome Convention on Damage 
Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the 
Surface, Rome, done 7 October 1952, entered into 
force 4 Febmary, 1958: 310 UNTS 181: providing 
for private liability for damage sustained by third 
parties on the ground. Cf. also P.N. Kooijmans. 
,s'tate Succession and the 1929 If'arsa1l' Convention: 
a Case StU{~V, in Air and Space Jaw: Dc Lege 
Ferenda (Eds. T.L. Masson-Zwaan & P.M.J. Mendes 
de Leon) (1992). 130, on the Warsaw Convention as 
a "law-making treaty] the only aim of which is the 
unification of private law". 
activities and the growing risks presented by 
space debris are the two major problems 
requiring priority treatment when it comes to 
the Liability Convention In these areas, 
particular and substantial success should and 
could be achieved in the enhancement of 
adherence to, and much more prominently, 
effective application of the Liability 
Convention. 
Here, the essential choice is between formal 
amendment (in whatever form) or informal 
but authoritative harmonization of 
interpretations. In respect of the. Liability 
Convention generally speaking the informal 
approach seams to provide the best chance of 
furthering the professed aim. 
Perhaps, from the practical and political 
point of view, the threats posed by largely 
uncontrolled space debris and largely 
uncontrolled privatization may not require a 
large measure of priority attention. But it is 
better to have a well-balanced elaboration of 
the Liability Convention in place before third 
party damage caused by space debris or by a 
privately launched space object actually 
occurs. 
In the Netherlands there exists a saying - and 
there will be little doubt that many more 
countries know similar wisdom - that usually 
one starts filling up the drinking pit only after 
the calf has drowned. Metaphorically 
speaking, it would be a real pity if we would 
not start to fill up the pit now, at relatively 
little cost, and thereby save a calf or two. 
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